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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
more recent segregation-discrimination cases and -similar Virginia statutes 24
was soundly reasoned and ably supported. It is the dissent's view that though
the federal courts decided certain recent cases25 under the Interstate Com-
merce Act,20 their language defined discrimination generally27 to be an abuse
of the right of the individual to equal protection of the laws,28 and thus
applicable to intrastate29 commerce. If the criterion of discrimination is to
be the effect on the individual rather than the group, the distinction between
interstate and intrastate traffic is immaterial. Since an interstate Negro
passenger would not be refused this seat,30 it is discrimination to this indi-
vidual petitioner, an intrastate passenger, to be refused this seat.3' Virginia
has an almost similar statute82 which regulates segregation on electric
vehicles but which prohibits contiguous seating "unless or until"3 all of the
other seats . . . shall be occupied. 13  The dissent treats all segregation
statutes as pari materia so that the "unless or until" limitation should apply
to all." As a result of this reasoning the dissent is able to hold for the
petitioner, and still uphold the validity of the statute.
The dissent in setting forth the definition of discrimination as being
an abuse of the rights of the individual, at the same time upholding the
constitutionality of segregation statutes, creates a conflict within its own
opinion, since it would seem that individual rights per se are incompatible
with segregation. However, this is unimportant since the constitutionality of
this statute was never questioned. Should this case come before the United
States Supreme Court it would seem to present a proper opportunity for
that Court to sustain the dissent concordantly with its present trend.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ANCILLARY ACTION FOR FOREIGN
DIVORCE ENJOINED
Pending final judgment in a separation action brought by defendant's
wife in a New York court, wherein defendant had appeared generally, de-
fendant established residence in the Virgin Islands where he sued plaintiff
24. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-390, 56-391, 56-392 (1950) (regulating segregation on
electric railways); VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56.396, 56-397 (1950) (regulating segregation on
steam railroads); VA. Corm ANN., §§ 56-452, 56-453 (1950) (regulating segregation on
steamship lines).
25. Henderson v. United States, supra note 12; Mitchell v. United States, supra
note 7; Chance v. Lambeth, supra note 20.
26. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1946).
27. Italics supplied by writer.
28. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 579.
29. Italics supplied by writer.
30. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (segregation statute in instant
case held unconstitutional on an interstate commerce basis). In New v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 186 Va. 726, 43 S.E.2d 872 (1947), it was held that the Morgan case only
applied to interstate passengers, not intrastate passengers.
31. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 580.
32. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-390, 56-391, 56-392 (1950).
33. Italics supplied by writer.
34. VA. CODE ANN., § 56-392 (1950).
35. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 581.
CASES NOTED
for divorce. Alleging the territorial residence to be sham, plaintiff moved the
New York court to enjoin the divorce as harmful to her separation action
because she would be burdened with proving the invalidity of the divorce, if
obtained. Defendant's attorney made a special appearance contesting the
New York court's jurisdiction to order injunctive relief as not being inci-
dental to the issues in the separation action, and contended that defendant's
general appearance in the separation action did not give the court juris-
diction to restrain the territorial divorce. Held, that the injunction should
issue. Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, N.E.2d 721 (1951).
In order for a court to render a valid personal judgment, jurisdiction
must be obtained over the defendant's person.' A general appearance brings
the defendant before the court for all proceedings incidental to the suit.
2
He is then bound by every subsequent order in the cause3 and cannot make
a special appearance thereafter to question the court's jurisdiction over him.
A court of equity having once assumed jurisdiction may retain it generally,
and such jurisdiction will not be defeated by subsequent events, even though
they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from ori-
ginally attaching.6 So, where jurisdiction of the person is obtained, it is not
defeated by a subsequent removal of the person beyond the jurisdiction of
the court.7
It is well recognized that a court of equity has the power to restrain
persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a foreign suit.8 This is de-
rived fron its more general authority to restrain its citizens from doing any
act contrary to equity and good conscience.0 The decree of the court is not
directed to the foreign court but proceeds in pesonam against the defendant
to enjoin him from carrying on an inequitable, harassing and vexatious suit
1. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893); Noxon Chemical Products
Co. v. Leckie 39 F.2d 318 (3rd Cir.) (notification by lawful process, or by voluntary
appearance), cert. denied sub nora. Robb v. Noxon Chemical Products Co., 282 U.S. 84
(1930).
2. Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195 (U.S. 1860); Durabilt Steel Locker Co. v.
Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F.2d 139 (N.D. Ohio 1927).
3. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Ridder v. Ridder, 175 Misc.
84, 22 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
4. Karpf v. Karpf, 260 App. Div. 701, 23 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1st Dep't 1940); see
Woodside v. United States, 60 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1932).
5. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 242 (1935); Camp v. Boyd, 229
U.S. 530, 552 (1913); United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 160 U.S. 1, 52 (1895).
6. See Highway Const. Co. v. McClelland, 15 F.2d 187, 188 (8th Cir. 1926);
Wright v. Price, 226 Ala. 468, 470, 147 So. 675, 676 (1933).
7. Ridder v. Ridder, supra note 3; Lassiter v. Wilson, 207 Ala. 669, 93 So. 598
(1922).
8. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256 (1894); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107
(1890); Ippolito v. Ippolito, 3 N.J. 561, 71 A.2d 196 (1950); see Royal League v.
Kavanaugh, 231 Ill. 175, 183, 84 N.E. 178, 180 (1908); Notes, 13 BROOKLYN L. REV.
148, 149 (1947), When Courts of Equity Will Enjoin Foreign Suits, 27 IowA L. REV.
76 (1941).
9. O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909); see Royal League v.
Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
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in another jurisdiction.10 Inequitable circumstances such as hardship, fraud,
or oppression create a probability of irreparable injury warranting an in-
junction once the foreign suit has been instituted." Injunctions have been
issued as a matter of public policy,' 2 upon false statements of residence in
another state,' 3 to protect substantive rights of one domiciled in the state
in which the injunction is sought," and to avoid the annoyance and ex-
pense made necessary by defending the foreign action. 15
A migratory spouse may be enjoined from prosecuting a foreign divorce,"
particularly when ancillary to a suit for alimony or separation." Injunctive
relief protects the marital rights of the would-be divorcee,' 8 inasmuch as an
ex parte foreign divorce decree is prima facie valid' 9 and is entitled to full
faith and credit20 in other jurisdictions.21 However such a decree may be
10. See Adams v. Adams, 180 Misc. 578, 579, 42 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Gwathmey v. Gwathmey, 116 Misc. 85, 88, 190 N.Y. Supp. 199, 201 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
11. Ex Parte Crandall, 52 F.2d 650 (S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 53 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1931),
cert, denied, 285 U.S. 540 (1932).
12. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (8th Cir. 1923).
13. Carr v. Cart, 5 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 980, 48 N.Y.S.2d
691 (1st Dep't 1944); see McDonald v. McDonald, 182 Misc. 1006, 1007, 52 N.Y.S.2d
385 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. I, 70 A.2d 630, 632 (1950) ("Since
equity has no power to restrain a person from obtaining a lawful divorce, it follows
that an injunction may only be granted where the spouse has not established a bona fide
domicile in the state in which the divorce is sought").
14. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 878, sub. 1 (1920) ("Where it appears that the
defendant, during the pendency of the action is doing ...an act in violation of the
plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual, an injunction order may be granted to restrain him therefrom"); Barzilay v.
Barzilay, 75 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281, 70
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1st Dept. 1947); Allan v. Allan, 63 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.I.Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (1899); see Wehrhane v. Peyton,
134 Conn. 486, 493, 58 A.2d 698, 702 (1948); Ippolito v. Ippolito, supra note 8, 71
A.2d at 198.
15. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 18 App. Div. 104, 218 N.Y. Supp. 87 (lst Dep't
1926); see Note, 36 ILL. B.I. 191, 192 (1947). But see Chicago, M, & St. P. Ry. v.
Schendel, supra note 1 at 334.
16. Pereira v. Pereira, supra note 14, Ciacco v. Ciacco, 50 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct.
1944); Holmes v. Holmes, 46 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Oltarsh v. Oltarsh, 181
Misc. 255, 43 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Selkowitz v. Selkowitz, 179 Misc. 608,
40 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Greenberg v. Greenberg, supra note 15; Ippolito v.
Ippolito, supra note 8. But see McDonald v. McDonald, suTIra note 13 (where residence
in the divorce state appears bona fide, the injunction will be denied).
17. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 184 Misc. 515, 53 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Maloney v. Maloney, 51 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Palmer v. Palmer. 268 App. Div.
1010, 52 N.Y.S.2d 383 (3rd Dep't 1944); Adams v, Adams, 180 Misc, 578, 42 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1943).
18. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 878 (1920), Palmer v. Palmer, supra note 17 (tends
to render ineffective any forthcoming judgment in the pending separation proceeding).
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 895
(1945); Esenwein v. Pa. ex tel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945); Zekowski v. Zekowski,
191 Misc. 914, 80 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Dalton v. Dalton, 270 App. Div.
69, 59 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dep't 1945); Herman v. Herman, 57 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
20. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1; see U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) [formerly 2 STAT. 298
(1804), U.S.C. §§ 687, 688 (1940)] where the rights given to the states by the full
faith and credit clause were extended to territories of the United States), Butler v.
Butler, 179 Misc. 651, 40 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (lawaiian divorce given full
faith and credit in New York).
21. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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later reexamined in the courts of a sister state on the jurisdictional fact of,
domicile.2 2 The burden is cast upon the party challenging the decree to
show that the divorcing spouse was not a bona fide resident 23 of the state in
which the divorce was granted.2 4 Cognizant of the aforementioned burden
the court granted the injunction in the instant case2a as an incident to the
separation action.
The decision apears to be a natural outgrowth of Williams v. North
Carolina,20 inasmuch as a foreign divorce if granted would adversely affect
the wife's marital status and tend to render ineffectual a separation judgment
in the wife's favor. Therefore it would seem that the migratory spouse is
deprived of a forum to test the question of his bona fide residence in another
jurisdiction. However, after final judgment in the separation suit Garvin v.
Garvin 2T does not preclude the husband from proving a bona fide domicile
in the Virgin Islands or elsewhere, and subsequently instituting a divorce
action.
EQUITY - INJUNCTION AGAINST CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
PROPER WHERE STATUTE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED
FOUND INAPPLICABLE
Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the sheriff from confiscating
a miniature bowling alley as a gambling device containing an "element of
chance or unpredictable outcome."' The chancellor's refusal to grant an
injunction was reversed. Held, equity will enjoin a criminal prosecution in-
terfering with a machine where its chance or unpredictability is predicated
on the player's skill instead of its mechanism, rather than undermine the
purpose of a statute by drastically construing it. Deeb v. Stoutamire, 53
So.2d 873 (Fla. 1951).
Traditionally, it has been stated that equity has no jurisdiction to en-
join prosecutions under statutes defining criminal offenses.-' The rationale
for this doctrine has been that the enforcement of the criminal law is a
22. Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 19.
23. See the definition of "bona fide resident" in Sneed v. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 22,
123 Pac. 312, 314 (1912) (". . . one who is in the state to reside permanently, and
who, at least for the time being, entertains no idea of having or seeking a permanent
home elsewhere"); see also Caheen v. Caheen, 233 Ala. 495, 496, 172 So. 618, 619
(1937) ("domicile" and "residence" are used interchangeably in divorce statutes);
Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 19 at 229 (where 'domicile" was defined as a"nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of
legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance").
24. See note 19 supra.
25. Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951); Notes, 25 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 364, 15 ALBANY L. REv. 29 (1951).
26. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
27. 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d (1951).
1. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1949).
2. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 143 (1950); MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 469-470
(2d ed. 1948); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISDICTION 978 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
